Black Officer Under-representation in Combat Arms Branches

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

BLACK OFFICER UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN COMBAT ARMS BRANCHES by MAJOR Emmett E. Burke, United States Army, 52 pages.

Although the integration of Blacks into the Army is a success story worth emulating, U.S. Army statistics indicate that Blacks do not participate evenly across officer career fields. In particular, Blacks are under-represented among the combat arms. This condition can be termed occupational segregation.

The U.S. Army's leadership is concerned about the low number of Black officers serving in the combat arms for two reasons. First, the low number of Blacks in the combat arms reduces the diversity and perhaps the credibility of the U.S. Army's leadership. Second, it makes it difficult for Blacks to attain appropriate representation among general officers because seventy-two percent of the U.S. Army's generals are selected from the combat arms.

To understand why so few Blacks select combat arms branches this study researched the U.S. Army's ROTC program at Historically Black College and Universities (HBCUs). This was appropriate because three-quarters of all officers are commissioned through ROTC and the majority of Black officers are commissioned from HBCUs.

The research revealed that there were two significant factors that determined the branch assignments of Black cadets: cadet performance and cadet attitude toward service. Black HBCU cadets compete adequately with other cadets when it comes to on-campus ROTC scores but they do poorly at Advanced Camp. Black cadets were less likely to consider the Army fair and had a negative perception of combat arms branches. These personal attitudes toward service have had a negative influence on performance. Additionally, Black cadets lack combat arms mentors to provide them the needed motivation, tutelage and guidance.

The Army must begin to mitigate these factors and reverse the under-representation of Black officers in combat arms. To increase representation of Black officers, the Army must train HBCU cadets to perform better at Advanced Camp, prepare HBCU cadets for the demands and unique culture of the Army, and commission more Black officers into combat arms branches to provide more mentors for Black cadets and officers in the future.

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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

On September 28, 1863, in a letter to President Abraham Lincoln, James Henry Gooding pled bitterly for Black soldiers to receive the same wages as White soldiers. Gooding's letter, received by President Lincoln a year after Blacks were admitted into the Union Army, prompted the War Department to begin treating Black soldiers more equitably. Today, Black soldiers enjoy far better treatment than their ancestors could have imagined. President Truman's Executive Order in 1948 paved the way for integration within the Army and opened doors to opportunities for Blacks, allowing them to hold supervisory and managerial positions uncommon in everyday civilian practice. The Army leads the American society in representing the diverse makeup of the country within its ranks. Men and women of all racial and ethnic groups and cultural backgrounds serve together reflecting the true diversity of the nation. The All-Volunteer Force of the 1970s spurred an interest among Blacks that increased their participation in the military and led to their current over-representation. Eligible Blacks available for military for service were plentiful and Army recruiters were very successful in recruiting large numbers of Blacks. Young Black men and women, attempting to overcome the oppressive racial conditions in the civilian sector, were more likely to see military service as a way to get ahead. Thirty years later, Blacks still perceive military service as a realistic and lucrative alternative. Consequently, there still remains a larger percentage of Blacks in the Army compared to their percentage of the American population. These numbers indicate that the treatment of Blacks in the Army has progressed a great deal and compares favorably to the treatment of Blacks found in civilian institutions. James Gooding would be flabbergasted to see the current state of diversity within the Army.

¹ Kevin Hillstrom and Laurie Collier Hillstrom, *American Civil War Primary Sources*, (Farmington Hills: U*X*L, an imprint of The Gale Group, 2000), 93

Diversity is a part of Army culture. Largely, it separates the Army from all other organizations in the world. "A direct link exists between military culture and effectiveness. The underlying culture of U.S. military forces is the foundation from which arise standards of behavior such as discipline, teamwork, loyalty, and selfless duty. The values and philosophies that have evolved as central to U.S. military culture have emerged from the noble basic tenets of the U.S. Constitution and the harsh lessons of the battlefield." Racial and gender equality is an Army standard of behavior. Anything outside of this standard is regarded as unacceptable. The Army Policy Statement on Equal Opportunity stipulates, "we challenge each leader to create and maintain an environment of zero tolerance for discrimination and sexual harassment. It is our obligation to the Army, to the nation, and to its' people." In addition to strong policy statements, the Army incorporates policies and procedures into the force through its' Equal Opportunity programs that train members to follow prescribed procedures.

The Problem

Equal opportunity was not always understood as it is today. At one time Army directives provided for segregation. Since the integration of the Armed Forces, the Army has effectively diversified its' ranks. The Army provides a successful example for other institutions to model. Blacks comprise twenty-nine percent of the Army and only eleven percent of all Army officers. However, a closer look at Army officer demographics indicates that some disparities exist. Gooding's statement is still valid but in another context. Today, the argument is not about equal pay and treatment. Today, the issue is the distribution of Black officers within the Army. The number of Black officers in combat arms branches of the Army is small, while the number of

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² Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. and others, "American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," a Report of the CSIS International Security Program (February 2000): 3.

³ Department Of The Army, "Army Policy Statement On Equal Opportunity," Internet, , Washington, D.C. 20310, August 10, 1995, Accessed March 10, 2002, http://www.asamra.army.pentagon.mil/ArmyPolicyStatementonEO.htm,.

⁴ Dr. Betty D. Maxfield, Army Demographics FY00, produced by: Headquarters, Department of Army Office of the Deputy chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, Demographics Unit

Black officers occupying non-combat arms positions is large, and growing disproportionately.⁵ A careful study of the demographics by occupational specialty indicates that most Black officers in the Army are found in combat support and combat service support branches.

Several conditions contribute to creating the odd distribution. One cause is the failure of Black officers to progress in rank and positions of responsibility at the same rate as their white counterparts. Other causes arise from conditions that exist outside the Army and result from the consequences of social and cultural influences. Nevertheless, the failure to access Black officers into the Army's combat arms occupations is a serious institutional concern. Several studies in recent years have attempted to shed some light on this issue. These studies provide data describing the increased flow of minorities into combat support and combat service support branches. An example of the disparity between combat and non-combat branches is illustrated by Army Infantry branch demographics. "The percentage of Blacks in the Infantry has dropped steadily from thirty percent in 1980 to fifteen percent currently, while the portion of Blacks in logistics units today often runs in excess of fifty percent." In 1999, the United States Military Academy (USMA) accessed only one Black cadet into the Infantry. He represented less than one percent of the total numbers of USMA cadets accessed into the Infantry and less than two

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⁵ Gooding's argument would be relative if we associate his definition of "soldiers" to today's combat soldiers and his definition of "laborers" to today's combat support and combat service support soldiers.

soldiers.

⁶ Dr. Betty D. Maxfield, Army Demographics FY00, produced by: Headquarters, Department of Army Office of the Deputy chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, Demographics Unit, Washington, D.C.

⁷ Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail," *Parameters*, (Autumn 1999), p. 54-69, available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99autumn/butler.htm, Internet; accessed 11 November 2001.

⁸ Several studies include a monograph on the "Lack of Ethnic diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?", Major Ronald. P. Clark, Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven worth, KS, Masters Thesis; U.S. Army Cadet command studies by Dr. Bert Huggins, "Analysis of Propensity of College Students to Participate in Army ROTC, with Special Emphasis on Historically Black Colleges and Universities," U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2 March, 1999. Accessed 20 November 2001, http://www-rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit have focused on Black Cadets and their propensity to serve and branch choices. Brigadier General Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail", Internet, Parameters, (Autumn 1999), pp. 54-69., http://carlisle-

percent of all Black USMA cadets accessed.¹⁰ Disparities in distribution of Army officers such as this cannot continue if the U.S. Army is to achieve a level of diversity commensurate with the ideals of the nation and the Army.

Significance of the Study

The Army must act now to fully integrate its organization so that it is prepared for the increasing population diversity. *On Diversity*, a study written by Colonel Andre H. Sayles to his Army War College classmates in 1998, provides the essential elements on why the Army needs to act now to achieve a fully integrated Army. The Army's effectiveness in the future demands it. "As America becomes more diverse, the Army will also become more diverse. By the year 2025, minorities in America will likely increase from the current twenty-eight percent to approximately forty percent of our national population." Another important reason for achieving complete integration is the need for vertical integration. Meaning, the Army should strive to achieve an equitable proportion of minority officers at all levels. In order to achieve this it is necessary that the Army strive for horizontal integration. Seamless integration will also prepare the Army for future force requirements. The importance of creating a diverse Army supports the need to ensure that inequitable practices and conditions are avoided. Ignored, the Army will revert to a condition reminiscent of the World War II segregated military.

Solving the problem is of immediate importance. "Racial imbalances in some types of units are not an entirely new phenomenon. Although there are no data to indicate that less integrated units are less operationally effective, many of the military's senior leaders come from these types

⁹ Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, "Racial Integration the Army Way," ARMY, July 1998, 30-31.

¹⁰ USMA Institutional Research and Analysis, Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, West Point, NY, 28 September 1999 found in Major Ronald P. Clark, "Lack of Ethnic diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?", Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Masters Thesis, p. 81.

of combat units, and a reduced number of minority officers with these credentials may eventually cause a decrease in the percentage of minority senior leaders. Further, the mere existence of racially segregated units or specialties is inconsistent with the best practices of a twenty-first-century national institution." Occupational segregation or horizontal segregation will prevent the Army from achieving diversity at the senior grades. In 1999, of the 233 General Officers in the Army, over seventy-two percent were combat arms officers. Eighty-three of the General Officers were from the Infantry branch compared to eighty-eight General Officers from non-combat arms branches. More combat arms officers achieve the rank of general than non-combat arms officers. If minorities are under-represented in combat arms branches, they will also be under-represented in the general officer ranks. Increasing the representation of minorities and women among general and flag officers will largely depend on increasing their numbers in career-enhancing occupations in lower ranks.¹⁴

Speculation over the causes of occupational segregation is fruitless without a concerted and determined effort on the part of the U.S. Army to address this issue. The U.S. Army Cadet Command Commander, Major General Casey, recently provided the senior level officer focus required to solve this specific problem. "A top priority, Casey said, is to recruit more minorities into combat arms jobs after commissioning." Major General Casey also wishes to find out why minorities are not excited about combat arms. He feels that the Army is not doing the right things

¹¹ Andre Sayles, "On Diversity," Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 20 July 1998; available from http://carlisle-

www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/divrsity/divrsity.htm,; Internet; accessed 20 October, 2001, p. 11.

12 Ulmer, Walter F., and others, "American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program (Washington, DC: February 2000) 75.

13 General Officer Management Office, Washington, D.C., 16 December 1999, found in Major

Ronald P. Clark, "Lack of Ethnic diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?" Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Masters Thesis, p. 78.

¹⁴Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness, "Career Progression Of Minority And Women Officers, Executive Summary," available from http://dticaw.dtic.mil/prhome/careerprog.html, Internet, accessed 18 December 2001,

Amee Puckett, "Making the hard sell: Cadet Command turning out gung-ho recruiters to boost ROTC enrollments across country," Army Times, Nov 19,2001, p. 28

now to attract minorities into combat arms jobs and he wants to find out what can be done to rectify the problem. ¹⁶ Major General Casey's remarks indicate that senior Army leaders are concerned about the future diversity of the officer corps. Moreover, his comments indicate a determined effort to rectify the disparity within Army officer ranks and to add more horizontal and vertical diversity to the Army's officer corps. The first step in achieving this goal must be to determine: Why Black officers are under-represented in combat arms branches?

Research Methodology

There are a variety of routes to obtaining a commission. To analyze the influence of social and cultural factors along each route is not feasible. Fortunately, most Army officers receive their commissions through Army ROTC. For that reason, it is possible to limit investigation to Army ROTC cadets and within that population to cadets from Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). HBCUs provide the largest number of Black officers in the Army. About half of all Black officers receive their commission from HBCUs.¹⁷

Tracing a cadet's path from joining ROTC to branch selection requires analysis in three areas. These areas are essential stages in the process of developing and selecting Army officers. These stages are the decision to join Army ROTC, performance as a cadet in social, academic, and military terms, and accession decisions and criteria. During the process of commissioning a cadet, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics influence the cadet's performance and choices. The policies and procedures of the university, the Army ROTC Cadet Command, and the ROTC accession process also influence the cadet's choices. Consequently, a systems approach facilitates finding answers to the research questions. The Army's Cadet Command and all HBCUs within Army ROTC routinely collect data on their cadets that provides much of the information needed on the source population.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way*, 1st ed., (New York: Basic Books, 1996) p.48.

Three research areas consumed the bulk of the effort for data collection and analysis.

Because the question is focused on branch accessions, the proper starting point was the accession process itself. By identifying the critical information elements of branch selection first, it was possible to identify those aspects of accessions that are influenced by the cadet himself. For example, each cadet must indicate both a branch preference and a duty preference. Social and cultural factors both on and off campus may influence that choice. Similarly, the manner in which the accession board considers the preference may significantly influence the cadet's prospects for selection to a combat arm.

The second area of research analyzed the student's decision to join Army ROTC. Here again, social and cultural factors both on and off campus influence that decision. Ultimately, students join ROTC for different reasons. Research in this area focused on identifying those reasons.

The third area of research focused on cadet performance in social, academic, and military terms. Students can participate in numerous activities on and off campus. Research within this area also analyzed cadet performance in ROTC activities. Cadet performance is measured by participation in ROTC, Advanced Camp and physical fitness training. Careful analysis of the steps necessary to attain a commission revealed information that helps explain why Black officers are under-represented in combat arms branches.

Occupational Segregation: Are Black Officers Under-represented in Combat Arms?

Ideally, ethnic representation within the Army should at least reflect roughly the ethnic proportions of the general population. Unfortunately, ethnic representation is not easy to achieve. It is important to understand that discrimination does not only consist of overt acts of bias and bigotry, or of identifiable unequal treatment of individuals or groups mainly based on their race. The present legal standard of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was

adopted as a result of the 1971 the Supreme court ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Practices must be measured by their consequences and effects, not merely by motive or intent. ¹⁸ Failure to avoid these consequences and effects can create the condition of occupational segregation.

Martin J. Watts is the Deputy Director at the Center of Full employment and Equity at the University of Newcastle, Australia. His research provides an in-depth look at the problem of occupational segregation in the U.S. Armed Services. He stated, "occupational segregation is said to exist when gender/race groups are differently distributed across occupations than is consistent with their overall shares of employment, irrespective of the nature of job allocation."

In 1999, among the over eleven percent of Black officers in the Army, sixty-one percent were employed in non-combat arms occupations and thirty-nine percent employed in combat arms. That same year, Army combat arms officers comprised fifty-six percent of all officers in the Army. If fifty-six percent of all Army officers are required to occupy combat arms positions then this standard should be closely proportionate to all ethnic groups. Unfortunately, this has not been the practice. Because sixty-one percent of Black officers were in non-combat arms branches, it can be concluded that Black officers were under represented in combat arms branches by seventeen percent; a definite example of occupational segregation.

Dr. Watts' work focuses on enlisted personnel but his research finds some systematic problems that are transferable to the Army's officer ranks and indicate that the Army cannot ignore occupational segregation in accessions and recruitment. To measure occupational

¹⁸ James A. Buford, Jr, *Personnel Management and Human Resources in Local Government, Concepts and Applications for Students and Practitioners, .*(Auburn, AL: Center for Governmental Services, 1991), 27.

¹⁹ Martin J. Watts, "The Evolving Pattern of Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender of Enlisted Personnel in the US Armed Forces, 1984-98." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, (Winter 2000 – Spring 2001): 50.

Defense Manpower Data Center, Washington D.C., December 1999, found in Major Ronald P. Clark, "Lack of Ethnic diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?" Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Masters Thesis, p. 81. Army Goals as represented by DCSPER basic branch requirements are 41 percent combat arms and 59 percent non-combat arms requirements.

segregation, Watts used an Index of Dissimilarity known as Silber's Multi-Dimensional Generalization. Most U.S. studies use the Index of Dissimilarity to measure both gender and race segregation in civilian employment. The Index of Dissimilarity provides an accepted method for determining the extent of occupational segregation and, thus, was used to compare the ethnic makeup of branch distribution. Watts' theory applied to officer demographics, supports the conclusion that occupational segregation exists in the officer career fields.²² Watt's study also provides a context for understanding that this is not a new condition. Dr. Watt's gathered data from 1984 to 1998 to describe an evolving pattern of occupational segregation among enlisted ranks of the Armed Services.

Regardless of the method used, the evidence shows Blacks within the Army have found employment in non-combat occupations. Black officers in the Army can be seen as segregated into non-combat arms branches. Unfortunately, data suggests that this condition has only worsened over the last several years. Occupational segregation is evident because the distribution of Black officers across occupations is not consistent with their overall shares of employment, irrespective of the nature of job allocation. ²³ Cadet Command data showing the branch assignments for Army ROTC cadets from academic years 1998 to 2001 indicates that an overwhelming number of Black cadets have been selected to serve in non-combat arms branches.

²¹ Martin J. Watts, "The Evolving Pattern of Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender of Enlisted Personnel in the US Armed Forces, 1984-98." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, (Winter 2000 – Spring 2001): 50.

²² Dr. Watts uses the Index of Dissimilarity equation to determine that occupational segregation exists in the Army. The author elaborates on this point in order to ensure the reader is provided with a strong argument supporting the condition of occupational segregation. Another perspective is necessary to provide evidence of this condition.

²³ Martin J. Watts, "The Evolving Pattern of Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender of Enlisted Personnel in the US Armed Forces, 1984-98." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, (Winter 2000 – Spring 2001): 51.




Figure 1. HBCU ROTC Branching Results 1998-2001²⁴

Three charts indicate the trends in branching results for Army ROTC cadets from 1998 to 2001. Figure one depicts the branching board results for HBCU cadets from 1998-2001. On average for the three accession years, over seventy percent of HBCU cadets were accessed to non-combat arms branches. Approximately twenty-eight percent of HBCU Black cadets were branched into combat arms branches. The rise in the accessions year 2000-2001 of sixteen percent was substantial. However, compared to the seven percent decrease from two periods prior, the aggregate increase over the three year is less than that compared to White ROTC cadets for the same period.

²⁴ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

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


Figure 2. Black (non-HBCU) Cadet Branching Results 1998-2001²⁵

Figure two illustrates cadet branching results among Black cadets at non-HBCU institutions. The results are worse than they are at HBCUs. Black cadets at non-HBCUs are faced with the tough challenge of performing in an environment dominated by the prevailing majority culture. Individuals survive in new environments by the act of assimilation or acculturation. Failure to assimilate would make social interaction difficult and could result in poor performance. Brigadier General Remo Butler in "Why Black Officers Fail?" describes the affect of cultural differences and how failing to adjust to changing conditions contributes to the failure of some Black officers in the Army. In addition, Black cadets at non-HBCUs also suffer from low GPAs and poor Advanced Camp Scores compared to White cadets. This places them at a disadvantage in competing for a high Professor of Military Science (PMS) Order of Merit List (OML) score because they are competing with non-Black cadets with higher GPAs and Advanced

Camp Scores. The logic here is that for ROTC competitive purposes, a Black cadet with a high GPA would compete more favorably at a HBCU. This explains why non-Blacks at HBCUs achieve higher Advanced Camp scores and GPAs compared to non-Blacks at other institutions. However, the two figures above make this point clear. The figures provide the evidence that there is an occupational segregation problem within the Army.




Figure 3. White ROTC Cadet Branching Results 1998-2001²⁶

Figure three depicts White ROTC cadet branching results during the same period.

Comparing Black cadets branching assignment with those of White ROTC cadets shows that

White cadets are accessed into combat arms branches at a much higher percentage than Black

Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.
 Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

cadets. In addition, the chart shows that White ROTC cadet accessions into combat arms branches rose ten percent in the accessions year 2000-2001. This was the highest percentage increase among all ROTC cadets.

Solving the problem of occupational segregation in the Army begins with a recognition of the problem. The data clearly indicates that occupational segregation exists within the Army. Black officers make up a larger percentage on non-combat arms branches and they are disproportionately under-represented in combat arms branches. Cadet accessions from 1998-2001 have continued this trend.

CHAPTER TWO: Why Blacks become cadets

Recognizing the problem of Black under representation in combat arms branches, it is possible now to seek the cause of this phenomenon. Determining the cause involves analyzing the motives of Blacks who choose non-combat arms branches. Part of the answer lies in the reasons why Blacks choose to serve in the military and to join ROTC in the first place. Thus, the first question is, why do Blacks become cadets? The answer can be found in the cultural and socioeconomic factors that influence a cadet's decision to remain in ROTC. Understanding these influences provides insight into the social factors that predispose Black officers to choose a non-combat arms branch.

Propensity to Serve

Racial composition in the Army is directly affected by the racial composition of accessions. Since the advent of the all-volunteer military force in the early 1970s, the Army has employed several different recruiting practices to meet the manpower demands of its force structure. All of these initiatives were instituted after considering the propensity of young Americans to serve in the military. There are varieties of influences that impact on a young adult's decision to join. One main influence is the desire to be a part of the Army. There is a

similarity between enlistment and seeking an appointment as an officer in that both require a commitment to the Army. Determining the factors that affect motivations for commitment to service yield insights into why people serve in the military.

Youth Attitudes Toward Service

Since 1975, the Department of Defense has conducted annually the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), a computer-assisted telephone interview of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young men and women. This survey provides information on the propensity, attitudes, and motivations of young people toward military service. Historically, Blacks have displayed a higher propensity to serve in the military compared to other groups. When questioned, Blacks most frequently mentioned money for college, job training, pay, travel, duty to country, and self-discipline as reasons for joining.²⁷ Blacks ranked pay and travel higher than other groups over duty to country. In contrast, Hispanics, like Whites, place a higher priority on duty to country over pay or travel. Whites and Hispanics choose to serve in combat arms branches at a higher rate over blacks.

Clearly, the study indicates that Blacks, who have a higher propensity to serve, join the Army for different reasons than other ethnic groups. The Black's preference for pay over a desire to serve the country, is related to the Black's predisposition to serve in non-combat occupations. Those recruits that join the Army out of a need to serve their country are more likely to serve in combat arms occupations. The Army demographic data from 1999 confirms the results of individual preferences. Sixty percent of White officers and fifty percent of Hispanic officers

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²⁷ 2000 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, commonly referred to as the Annual Defense Report, available from http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html; Internet; accessed 19 December 2001.

served in combat arms branches. Conversely, only thirty-nine percent of Black officers served in combat arms branches.²⁸

Comparison of Propensity and Recruitment Trends

In 1999, *Armed Forces and Society* published the results of a study by several researchers that illustrates annual trends between high school seniors who are "likely to enter" and seniors who "want to enter" the armed forces from 1976-1997. From 1980 to 1984, there is evidence of an increasing trend in the propensity to serve in the military among Black male and female seniors. During that same period, Blacks increased their percentage of Army officer accessions from six percent to ten percent. Never again would the Army achieve as high an increase in accessions among Blacks. Even though the number of Black college graduates continued to rise after 1984, the number of Black officer accessions after 1984 rose only marginally. After 1984, Blacks' propensity to serve declined rapidly. After which it remained relatively constant until another period of decline in 1990. During this period from 1984 to 1990, Black officer accessions rose gradually until 1991 when the percentage declined from eleven percent to eight percent in 1993. During that same period, the percentage of Black high school seniors stating they "definitely will" enter the Armed Services declined over twenty percent.

A number of factors contributed to the sharp decline in enlistment propensity.

Unemployment rates, recruiting incentives, and the downsizing of the Army are but a few of the

²⁸ Defense Manpower Data Center, Washington D.C., December 1999, found in Major Ronald P. Clark, "Lack of Ethnic diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?", Army command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Masters Thesis, p. 77.

²⁹ Jerald G. Bachman, and others, "Propensity to Serve in the U.S. Military: Temporal Trends and Subgroup Differences," *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 3, (spring 1999): 420.

³⁰ Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, "Population Representation in the Military Services Fiscal Year 1998, Black Active Officer Accessions, Fiscal Years 1973-98, available from http://dticaw.dtic.mil/prhome/poprep98/html/d22.html, accessed 17 December 2001.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Jerald G. Bachman, and others, "Propensity to Serve in the U.S. Military: Temporal Trends and Subgroup Differences," *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 3, (spring 1999): 420.

factors that changed the propensity to serve in the military. More importantly, Black propensity to serve has had a profound impact on accessions and will continue to do so. Unchanged, however was the priority that Blacks placed on "duty to country" as a motive to join the military. These factors and motivations to serve have been compared to the choices that Black cadets make toward branches and their attitude toward ROTC and the Army. Dr. Bert Huggins at the United States Army Cadet Command Headquarters conducted a study to determine factors that influence recruitment and retention of African-Americans. His study, *Analysis of Propensity of College Students to Participate in Army ROTC, with Special Emphasis on Historically Black Colleges and Universities*, compared four HBCUs and four comparable non-HBCUs. Schools were selected as matched pairs. The schools were geographically similar and cost of school was about the same. Responses came from students, cadets, and faculty.

In his findings, Dr. Huggins observed that the domain of fairness was the most significant variable when compared to the domain of propensity and perceived unfairness was a strong inhibitor to commissioning."³³ Other findings from the study were:

- HBCU cadets were less likely to talk about ROTC to non-participating students and less likely to recommend the program.
- HBCU cadets were less likely to see the Army as fair.
- HBCU cadets were far less likely to see the military as appealing.
- HBCU cadets had a lower opinion of the cadre.³⁴

The opinions of cadets did not differ much from those of students on the same HBCU campuses.

"All students in the study were far less positive toward Army ROTC than faculty and the HBCU students were significantly more negative than non-HBCU students toward the Army and ROTC.

These students were less supportive of a cadet's decision to participate in ROTC and less inclined

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³³ Bert Huggins, "Analysis of Propensity of College Students to Participate in Army ROTC, with Special Emphasis on Historically Black Colleges and Universities,".(U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, VA., 2 March, 1999); available from http://www-rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/; Internet; accessed 20 November 2001.

to participate themselves." Overall, HBCU students had poorer opinions of ROTC and the Army. This poor opinion is relatively consistent with the YATS study and youth attitudes toward military service noted earlier. Blacks ranked "pay" above "duty to country" as a reason for serving in the military. HBCU students expressing the same priority are less likely to see the correlation of ROTC and future benefits, if they are not knowledgeable of the benefits. "The study found that cadets were influenced by the beliefs and opinions of students, e.g., cadets at a school where students believed the Army was not fair, tended also to believe that the Army was not fair."³⁵ Students' attitudes will continue to have a major impact on cadets' performance in ROTC and the branch he later chooses to serve. HBCU students and cadets opinions and attitudes are influenced by their culture and environment. The culture in the HBCU environment portrays the Army as a less fair organization because the Army service benefits do not compete with other organizations. However, Blacks do join the Army and ROTC and continue their service in higher percentages than other groups. This infers that non-combat arms branches meet the long-term needs of HBCU students and because their needs are satisfied, Blacks remain in the Army. Consequently, research reveals the reason cadets join ROTC is directly related to the branch they choose.

Social influences have different impacts on Black students. As indicated above, it is obvious that African-Americans join the Army or become cadets for their own unique reasons that differ from other groups. Duty to country is not a priority for Blacks relative to other groups. Pay is important and connotes a more personal interest. The concern for pay translates into a reduced willingness to endure the hardships of occupations that do not provide job skills directly transferable to civilian life.

³⁴ Ibid. 35 Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE: Factors influencing Black cadet performance

Army Accessions and Branching Boards

The Department of the Army ROTC Accessions and Branching Boards are two separate but related processes that have a large impact on the quality and demographic mix of the Army's future officer corps. The Cadet Command Accession Board (CCAB) convenes each October to establish an order of merit list (OML) for all cadets whose graduation date falls within an accession zone established by Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The OML established by the CCAB serves as primary input to the DA/ROTC Selection and Branching Board that meets subsequent to the CCAB to determine the type of commission and branch cadets will receive.³⁶ For a cadet to rank at the top on the OML, he must exhibit qualities and demonstrate performance that rank above his peers. Individual cadet performance in ROTC activities and in school academics determines whether a cadet will receive an active duty commission and the branch of his choice. A cadet earns points based on his performance and the points are collected as part of the Cadet Evaluation System (CES). The Army ROTC CES has three major components: academic (grade point average), on-campus PMS evaluation, and Advanced Camp evaluation. For the accession process, the cadet performance indicators are the Professor of Military Science (PMS) ranking and comments, the cadet's cumulative grade point average, and Advanced Camp Performance.³⁷ The cadet's PMS OML

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³⁶ Department of the Army, United States Army ROTC Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Cadet Command Regulation 145-9, Reserve Officers' Training Corps Accessioning and Commissioning, 24 August 1992, p.3.

The Army ROTC Accession process is very detailed and will be summarized to provide the reader with a general understanding of the process. There are two elements of the process: Accessions Board and Branching Board. The Accessions board is conducted each academic year to evaluate all cadet files in order to construct a Army ROTC cadet Order of Merit List (OML). This list ranks all cadets that will be later processed for a branch and then commissioning. The Branching board uses the Accessions Board OML and other criteria to select cadets for branch choice. The author of this monograph could not attain details into the branching process. Several attempts were made to U.S. Army Cadet Command and U.S. Army Personnel Command to acquire the specific guidance that is given to Branching board members. The information for this monograph in reference to Accessions and Branching boards was attained from the US Army Cadet Command, Accessions Bulletin, July 2001, available from

ranking is influenced by his performance on campus in the ROTC program. However, that score is also influenced by his academic performance and by his Advanced Camp evaluation. Thus, the cadet's OML ranking is not an independent variable in the accession equation.

Activities in the HBCU ROTC program provide the cadet an opportunity to compete with his peers during campus ROTC activities. On campus, participation helps a cadet to achieve the best rating possible from his Professor of Military Science OML ranking. The HBCU cadet has the same opportunity as other cadets to achieve his best possible cumulative grade point average. The PMS OML rating and GPA scores carry the same weight within the CES for all institutions. Thus, HBCU cadets are not disadvantaged relative to other cadets on these two portions of the accession process. However, HBCU cadets do not perform well at Advanced Camp and that performance diminishes the cadet's accession evaluation. The following charts show HBCU cadet's academic performance and Advanced Camp scores. The charts also indicate trends in performance that directly influence branch preferences and accessions.

Cadet's overall rating by the PMS must incorporate the cadet's performance in ROTC on campus but it must place more weight on academic performance and camp performance.

http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/pa_/accessionsregul_/accessionsbulle/accessionsbulle.doc, Internet, accessed 20 November, 2001, p.5

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Academic Performance




Figure 4. Cadet GPA Comparisons 1998-2001³⁸

HBCU ROTC cadets' cumulative grade point averages were compared to White ROTC cadets grades for the accessions periods from 1998 to 2001. The evidence indicates that HBCU cadet grade point averages trail the GPA at all other ROTC schools. As the chart shows, in almost every case, White cadets achieved higher GPA scores than HBCU cadets in all branch groups. Educational standards at different institutions may have an impact on GPAs but it is not significant here because the accession model and boards evaluate files on the GPA of cadets objectively. Accession boards do not judge the GPA based upon the school's academic reputation; hence, a GPA of 3.0 at an HBCU is the same as for an institution that may have a greater or lesser academic reputation. The same rational applies when comparing PMS OML

³⁸Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

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scores. Consequently, GPA and PMS OML scores are weighed objectively in the CES and schools with higher academic standards are not favorably weighted over other institutions. Thus, the HBCU student has the same opportunity as other ROTC students to achieve a competitive GPA as part of his CES computation.

ROTC performance and PMS OML

The Professor of Military Science at HBCUs evaluates each of his cadets to develop an order of merit list. The PMS assigns to each cadet an OML score. That score is used by the accessions and branching boards. "PMS input carries a tremendous amount of weight with voting board members." The PMS is responsible for the preparation of all accession packets and the OML for his unit. The PMS must determine those factors which will be used to establish the OML. He should consider as a minimum, Advanced Camp performance, battalion participation, and campus activities (GPA included). The minimum considerations for the PMS OML emphasizes the importance of the two key evaluation elements mentioned earlier: GPA and Advanced Camp Score. It is in the PMS OML that a cadet's overall performance can best influence the accessions decision, his choice of active duty, and the branch assignment. In addition, if a cadet is suffering in one area; e.g., GPA, a strong performance in on-campus ROTC activities and Advanced Camp can help him rank high on the PMS OML.

Data was not available to compare cadet OML scores from HBCUs with other institutions. However, figure five illustrates the relationship of PMS OML scores to other CES components. The chart below from the 2001 U.S. Army Cadet Command Accessions Bulletin shows that those cadets that were accessed into combat arms branches achieved a higher average

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³⁹ Accessions Camp Brief 2001, US Army Cadet Command, available from http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/pa_/accessionsregul_/accessionsbulle/accessionsbulle.doc, Internet, accessed 10 December 2001.

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, United States Army ROTC Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Cadet Command Regulation 145-9, Reserve Officers' Training Corps Accessioning and Commissioning, 24 August 1992, p.4.

PMS score than non-combat arms branches⁴¹. This suggests that a higher PMS score is probably necessary for a cadet to be accessed into a combat arms branch. Not considering the specialty branches, cadets branched combat arms averaged the higher percentage of branch satisfaction for first choice selections. The chart clearly indicates that selection to a combat arms branch is reserved for cadets with strong performance results and a desire to become a combat arms officer.

ACTIVE DUTY BRANCH PROFILE **FY 01 ACCESSIONS BOARD**

BRANCH								BRANICH ACAD EMIC MICK (% Told Selecto)				BRANCH CHOICE SATTS FACTION (By percentage)			
	TOTAL # SEL	CAMP	ANG OPA	AVG PMS	AVG OMS	% 80 H0 L	% R	BIGR.	PHYS SCI	ТЕСН МОЛТ	O EN	181	ZND	3RD	OTHER
IN	279	877	226	589	34.40	62.7%	502%	35%	6.1%	17.5%	72.0%	76.3%	122%	5.6%	6.19
AR	142	263	226	57.7	3230	655%	507%	5.6%	25%	26.1%	59.9%	68.3%	303%	1.6%	0.09
FA	256	843	282	415	22.80	8D.4%	500%	6.4%	12.1%	20.2%	60.7%	17.4%	17.4%	379%	37.79
AD	96	249	295	502	30.0	65.7%	500%	4.Z%	10.6%	26.0%	59.4%	9.4%	365%	49.0%	5.29
AU	167	225	313	650	36.30	78.4%	503%	14.4%	11.6%	23.6%	50.9%	95.2%	42%	0.6%	0.09
BI	129	250	293	54.1	31.50	73.5%	503%	37.6%	19.0%	17.5%	25.5%	65%	41.3%	11.6%	1.69
Cbl Arms	1171	953	291	537	32.32	652%	502%	117%	11.1%	21.0%	96.2%	52.6%	21.3%	152%	1039
80	248	255	303	522	31.70	77.4%	500%	169%	12.1%	21.6%	435%	44.4%	47.2%	5.6%	2.29
MI	301	253	296	522	31.70	62%	502%	3.7%	12.0%	12.9%	65.4%	52%	203%	7.0%	150%
MP	77	873	312	649	35.20	75.3%	50.6%	35%	7.2%	15.6%	72.7%	99.7%	27.3%	10.4%	2.69
CM	23	233	272	349	27.10	60.2%	50.6%	9.6%	36.1%	19.3%	349%	12.1%	21.7%	9.6%	5069
ChiSal	709	254	297	51.6	31.54	70.7%	502%	9.0%	16.5%	19.5%	55.D%	6.7%	306%	7.2%	1359
AG	97	250	311	57.2	32.20	72.2%	505%	3.1%	10.3%	24.7%	61.9%	27.2%	536%	3.1%	155%
FI	0	873	328	672	35.10	77.5%	500%	0.0%	25%	22.5%	15.0%	90.0%	50%	5.0%	0.09
0.0	213	841	283	426	28.90	6.1%	502%	113%	10.3%	18.3%	60.1%	15.0%	239%	183%	4129
QM	210	245	292	49.7	30.0	60.5%	500%	33%	11.6%	25.7%	59.5%	315%	500%	110%	2.69
TC	150	249	291	453	30.0	65.7%	500%	6.0%	93%	Z+D%	60.7%	28.7%	527%	167%	2.09
முபது தேர	710	847	296	427	30.6	653%	50.1%	6.1%	10.0%	26.2%	57.7%	28.7%	407%	130%	17.69
O PMD SUBTOTAL	2990	256	294	51.7	31.60	67%	902%	9.6%	12.3%	Z2.D%	96.3%	€0%	292%	127%	1329
AN	124	252	311	509	3200	90.3%	00%	0.0%	0.0%	Z2.0%	0.0%	100.0%	00%	0.0%	0.09
MS	159	874	311	622	34.80	76.1%	503%	3.1%	15.1%	Z35%	57.9%	69%	302%	1.3%	0.09
88	1	932	330	250	443	100.0%	00%	0.0%	1000%	0.0%	0.0%	00%	00%	0.0%	100.09
AMEDO	224	267	311	57.3	33.61	32.4%	425%	1.2%	22%	13.6%	32.4%	21.7%	17.3%	0.7%	0.69
TOTAL/AVG	227 +	257	296	523	31.20	69.2%	480%	8.7%	11.5%	21.2%	539%	6.6%	280%	115%	1199

Figure 5. FY01 Accessions Data⁴²

Advanced Camp Performance

Figure five also illustrates another important relationship between PMS OML scores and a cadet's performance at Advanced Camp. When the PMS score is high the Advanced Camp score is also high. Combat arms branches averaged the highest Advanced Camp scores.

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⁴¹ Accessions Bulletin, US Army Cadet Command, available from, http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/pa /accessionsregul /accessionsbulle/accessionsbulle.doc, Internet, accessed 10 December 2001. 42 Ibid.

Advanced Camp is an important event for a cadet wishing to receive a high PMS OML score and his branch choice. Advanced camp is composed of several events that a cadet must be previously trained on in order to perform well. These events also are components in a complex process used to evaluate cadet leadership abilities.

Advanced Camp removes the cadet from his campus academic environment and provides for evaluation by officers and NCO's from other ROTC schools. The Advanced Camp score, like the cadet's GPA, is based solely on the cadet's performance at Advanced Camp. Camp evaluation focuses primarily on leadership abilities. The Advanced Camp cadre evaluate each cadet's performance in several leadership positions. The cadet is observed in garrison, during the Field Leader Reaction Course (FLRC), on the Squad Situational Training Exercises, on the Platoon Situational Training Exercises, and informally evaluated as a follower throughout camp. Additionally, the cadet's Advanced Camp score includes his performance on the Army Physical Fitness Test and Land Navigation Course. Leadership is rated by the platoon tactical officer and he considers the scores from the other military proficiency activities in determining the final score.

Advanced Camp Platoon Tactical officers (PTO) are Army majors or captains in each platoon that have the primary responsibility for evaluating cadet's performance. During an Advanced Camp cycle, PTOs formally evaluate cadets in a minimum of seven assigned leadership positions. Positions evaluated include company commander, executive officer, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader. Three of the required positions are at garrison level, with at least one at the platoon sergeant level or higher. Each cadet is evaluated during four tactical leadership situations and the leadership tests include one position in Field Leadership Reaction Course, two during Squad Situational Training Exercises, and one during Platoon Situational Training Exercises.

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⁴³ Advance Camp 00 SOP, Section E-Evaluations, U.S. Army Cadet Command, available from http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/. Internet, accessed 13 January 2002, p. E-1.

Peer Ratings

All cadets receive two peer ratings on all cadets. Cadets receive one evaluation at the squad level and the results are assigned a peer rating score. The PTO counsels each cadet on the results during an individual counseling session. At the end of camp and before graduation, cadets evaluate their peers again. The final peer evaluation or resulting peer rating score is not provided to the Platoon Tactical Officers until the evaluation process is complete. Peer evaluations are an important factor because they provide the cadre and cadet with a report on how his peers perceive his value to the group. HBCU cadets adjusting to a majority white male environment have to contend with this change in organizational culture more so than other students. His inability to acculturate will likely be perceived by the members of his platoon and a resultant low peer evaluation can be expected. This negative perception can make the process even more challenging for the HBCU cadet that must learn to assimilate with his new environment. This added challenge is not shared by other cadets and places the HBCU cadet at a disadvantage while competing with his peers at Advanced Camp.

Military Proficiency Activities

HBCU cadets have not done well in the graded Military Proficiency activities. The following charts show the results of the 2001 U.S. Cadet Command Advanced Camp Training. The results indicate that HBCU cadets did not performe as well as their peers in several graded events. Consequently, their Advanced Camp scores were poorer and which lowered their evaluations. The following charts list on Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) scores, land navigation written scores, and Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) scores. BRM results are included comparison purposes but those scores are not part of the graded military proficiency activities. BRM results provide additional data on HBCU cadet performance at Advanced Camp. The data shows that on all the graded activities considered here, HBCU cadets perform on average more poorly than other identified groups of cadets.




Figure 6. 2001 Advanced Camp APFT Scores by School Category⁴⁴

Army Physical Fitness Scores

The Army Physical Fitness Test is an evaluated event at Advanced Camp. The APFT for each regiment is administered on the fourth day of camp. Cadets are evaluated on three events, pushups, sit-ups, and the 2-mile run, as specified in FM 21-20. The passing score on APFT is 180 total points and 60 points in each event. If the initial test is failed, one retest is allowed. A passing score on the retest is awarded the minimum score of 180 regardless of the retest APFT

⁴⁴ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

score. Failure to pass the APFT is grounds for dismissal from camp. ⁴⁵ The AFPT scores for HBCU cadets were the lowest among aggregate scores for all other institutions at Advanced Camp. The average HBCU cadet score was two hundred and forty two points. The average score for all cadets administered APFT was two hundred and fifty-four points. ⁴⁶ More than any of the other events at Advanced Camp, the APFT test reflects the training a cadet received at the university ROTC program. Because the test is administered on the fourth day of camp, cadets must arrive at camp physically prepared. Advanced camp policy states that cadets will maintain their physical condition at camp through participation in scheduled physical training sessions and physically demanding training. ⁴⁷ The focus of Advanced Camp is to sustain fitness and not to raise it to a competitive level. It is the responsibility of the institution and individual cadet to ensure he arrives at Advanced Camp in excellent physical condition.

The APFT results indicate the standard of training at the ROTC unit and it indicates the cadet's personal commitment to achieve a competitive score. Figure six clearly shows that physical training at HBCUs has not prepared their cadets to be competitive at Advanced Camp. In contrast, non-Blacks at HBCUs score much higher on the APFT on average than Black HBCU cadets. The difference between Black and non-Black APFT scores suggests that the low APFT scores for Blacks are a result of some factor other than ROTC unit training. The poor performance on the APFT can be attributed to the negative perception HBCU cadets have of ROTC and the Army. Negative attitudes affect cadet motivations to perform. Motivation and enthusiasm increase the positive effects of training and are necessary to achieve a high level of fitness and a competitive APFT score.

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Cadet Information (Fort Monroe, VA, 28 January 2000), p. 2.

⁴⁵ Cadet Command Circular 145-00-2, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2000 ROTC Advanced Camp Cadet Information (Fort Monroe, VA, 28 January 2000), p.4.

 ⁴⁶Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations
 Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.
 ⁴⁷Cadet Command Circular 145-00-2, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2000 ROTC Advanced Camp

⁴⁸ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

Land Navigation




Figure 7. 2001 Advanced Camp Land Navigation Scores by School Category⁴⁹

The Land Navigation score consists of three components: a written examination, daylight practical exercise, and night practical exercise worth twenty, fifty, and thirty percent respectively. The cadet will take both practice and record tests of each practical exam. The minimum requirement for passing is a score of seventy percent on the written test (fourteen of twenty points), the daylight practical test (five of eight stakes, thirty-five of fifty points), and the night

⁴⁹ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

practical test (three of five stakes, twenty-one of thirty points). One retest is available for each exam. Those who require and pass a retest will receive the minimum qualification score for that particular component regardless of the actual score on retest.⁵⁰ HBCU cadets achieved land navigation scores lower than all other schools. The average land navigation written exam score among HBCU cadets at Advanced Camp was seventeen. The average score for all cadets on the land navigation written exam was eighteen.⁵¹ The large difference in scores is also seen in the day and night practical exercise results. The practical exercise accounts for eighty percent of the total land navigation score. Clearly HBCU cadets receive too little training on practical land navigation skills before attending Advanced Camp. The causes for this training deficiency are many. One cause may be a shortage of available areas suitable for land navigation. For example, students from ROTC programs that are close to military installations are likely to have access to an abundance of training resources. The cadets at these programs will undoubtedly perform better at Advanced Camp other factors being equal⁵² However, an ROTC program does not require a large amount of resources to train cadets to perform well on the land navigation written evaluation. Fortunately, cadets receive some land navigation training at Advanced Camp that provides them the opportunity to learn the skills needed to be more competitive.

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⁵⁰ Cadet Command Circular 145-00-2, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2000 ROTC Advanced Camp Cadet Information (Fort Monroe, VA, 28 January 2000), p.4.

⁵¹ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

⁵² Authors personal experience as a cadet attending Advanced Camp in 1987 and supported with notes with other officers attending the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from June 2000 to December 2002. Author was a ROTC student at Columbus State University and conducted training at Fort Benning, Ga on numerous occasions. The training at Fort Benning (day and night land navigation training, rifle marksmanship training) provided the CSU cadets with a noticeable advantage over other cadets at Advanced Camp.

Basic Rifle Marksmanship




Figure 8. 2001 Advanced Camp Basic Rifle Marksmanship Scores by School Category⁵⁴

HBCU cadets lack some basic soldier skills. HBCU cadets did much more poorly on BRM than cadets at other schools, figure eight.⁵⁵ All cadets are required to qualify with an M16 rifle at Advanced Camp. Again, HBCU cadets had the lowest aggregate score among the other institutions at Advanced Camp. This may be true because live fire training could not easily be done on campus. This figure makes clear that some institutions are able to better train their cadets. The chart does not, however, indicate the resources available at he different schools.

Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the training differences arise solely from the lack of available range facilities.

Advanced Camp places the cadet in a very different environment compared to his college campus setting. The cadet has to handle the dynamics of group interaction and competition.

Cadet performance obviously varies depending on the level of training that the cadet receives before arriving at camp. Data indicates that certain institutions perform better than others on most events. Cadets from HBCUs performed less well when compared to other cadets from other institutions. It is unclear why HBCUs do not perform well. However, the poor results on graded events have a negative impact on the cadets overall score. The evaluation received on the APFT and Land Navigation events represent twenty percent of the cadet's Advanced Camp total score. If a cadet does not perform well in these areas, he will be less competitive in the accession process and have only a small chance of receiving a branch reserved for those cadets with high marks.

CHAPTER FOUR: How social influence and performance affect combat arms accessions

What does all this mean? HBCU cadets perform less well academically than cadets from other institutions. The Advanced Camp results for HBCUs are also generally poorer.

Consequently, HBCU cadets will have less competitive files when the accession boards review their record.

Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.
55 Ibid

⁵⁶ US Army Cadet Command, Accessions Bulletin, (Fort Monroe, VA, July 2001), available from http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/pa/accessionsregul/accessionsbulle/accessionsbulle.doc, Internet, accessed 8 December 2001, p.5.

Leaving aside the issue of the quality of training, there are personal factors that can also decrease performance. These personal factors include negative perception, lack of role models, and culture shock or the Black cadet's struggle to transition from his HBCU campus culture into a more integrated Advanced Camp environment. Analysis of some of the personal factors helps explain why Black HBCU cadets have been less competitive for accessions into combat arms.

Negative Perceptions

The Youth Attitude Tracking Study indicated that historically Blacks demonstrate a higher propensity to serve. The Black population as a whole shows a higher propensity to serve and the Army's enlisted ranks are representative of this. Thirty-two percent of the Army's enlisted force is Black. However, only eleven percent of the Army officer corps is Black. The cause for this disparity can be attributed to the change in attitudes toward military service when Blacks enter college and experience ROTC. This divergence in attitudes toward service between high school seniors and ROTC contracted cadets is not the same for White or Hispanic students. Thus, some factor other than the ROTC experience causes this change.

Negative Perception of the Army and ROTC

One possible explanation is the attitude of the campus student body toward ROTC. Dr. Bert Huggins', Cadet Command study clearly shows the impact a negative perception of the Army can have on student attitudes toward ROTC.⁵⁷ Demographic analysis showed that females tended to have less positive views than males about ROTC. However, despite the fact that females are a large portion of HBCU cadets, this did not explain the differences between HBCUs and non-HBCUs.

⁵⁷ Huggins, p.2. ⁵⁸ Ibid, 3.




Figure 9. Dr Huggins' Study of HBCU Student's Opinions of ROTC⁵⁹

Figure nine represents the results of Dr. Huggins analysis. The data showed that some of the differences in opinion among cadets followed their ethnicity more than the type of school. African-American cadets were generally less enthusiastic about ROTC and did not see the Army as positively as did White cadets. While these differences were not dramatic, they were statistically significant. This analysis is significant because it identifies a trend that is consistent with the failure of Black cadets to select combat arms branches. Dr. Huggins study also determined that Non-African-American cadets at HBCUs tended to be much more positive about the Army and ROTC than their African-American counterparts. This positive attitude explains in part the fact that they performed better than Blacks at HBCUs and thus were more competitive for the branch of their choice.

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⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 3.

Negative Perception of Combat Arms Branches

Several studies have concluded that Black cadets perceive that combat arms branches do not prepare a career outside the Army. Thus, if their first choice of branch is intended to support their long-term career objectives which includes a civilian career, the combat arms are unattractive. Using existing marketing studies and focus groups, Dr Huggins observed that personal goals influenced a cadet's choice of branch and he concluded that Blacks held a non-altruistic motive for joining the military. Black cadets were more likely to select a branch because of long-term career objectives. Although Dr. Huggins concludes that not one variable was dominant in predicting whether a cadet would choose a combat arm, he did discover that African-Americans were more likely to:

- Join ROTC to gain skills useful in a career outside the Army
- Perceive that combat arms branches deploy more
- Be influenced by branch orientation to not select combat arms
- Select branches based on long-term career objectives
- Believe that combat arms do not prepare one for an Army career as well as noncombat arms branches.⁶²

These results indicate a negative perception that is damaging to an ROTC training environment and ultimately to the accession process. There is a direct link between an organization's climate and its' effectiveness as a unit. Negative perceptions of ROTC and the Army are only detrimental to establishing and maintaining an effective ROTC program. Cadets that share these

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⁶¹ Bert Huggins, "Comparative Study of Branch Choices: Executive Summary: Factors that Influence the Branching Decision." (U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, VA., March 1999); available from http://www-rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/; Internet; accessed 20 November 2001 and Ronald P. Clark, The Lack of Ethnic Diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000.

⁶² Bert Huggins, "Comparative Study of Branch Choices: Analysis of survey responses of commissioning cadets on reasons for selection of branch with special emphasis on African-American and

views are likely not as effective when compared to cadets that exude a higher degree of confidence about the Army. Overlay these differences within the competitive environment at Advanced Camp and it becomes possible to understand how cadet attitude toward ROTC influences Advanced Camp Performance.

Lack of Role Models

HBCU cadet perceptions and attitudes of ROTC cannot be viewed in isolation. Other factors work in concert with them to generate the conditions of poor performance at Advanced Camp. Another factor contributing to poor cadet performance and under-representation of Blacks in combat arms branches is the lack of role models to mentor HBCU ROTC cadets. COL Sayles' thesis discusses the importance of role models.

"Women and minorities will only know for sure that they can achieve success through hard work if they have seen it done by one of their own. They need to believe that they can be the same, but different and still make it to the top. They need to know that they can be successful without abandoning all of their differences in order to emulate fully the dominant culture. Women and minority role models that go beyond tokenism in an organization prove that stories about glass ceilings and "good old boy" networks are not true. For the Army, these women and minority role models need to be at all levels and in all branches."63

Black cadets from HBCUs require the same mentoring that all cadets and officers need to become a successful professional in the Army. Being a mentor to a cadet requires one to be an experienced adviser and supporter: somebody, usually older and more experienced, who provides advice and support to, and watches over and fosters the progress of, a younger, less experienced person. Without a pool of accomplished Black combat arms officers, it will be difficult for Black cadets and officers to find someone that shares the same social and cultural heritage that they do. Brigadier General Remo Butler's research on "Why Black Officers Fail" observed that "a black mentor who understands Black culture and who has been successful in a military environment

www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/divrsity/divrsity.htm, Internet; accessed 20 October, 2001, p. 11.

minority branch choices,".(U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, VA., 8 September, 1998); available from http://www-rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/; Internet; accessed 20 November 2001. p. 20.

⁶³ Andre Sayles, "On Diversity," Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 20 July 1998; available from http://carlisle-

that predominately reflects the culture of the white majority can usually relate best to the young black officer. It is critical for young black officers to find a good mentor."⁶⁵ Brigadier General Butler's comments are focused on the performance of Black officers in the Army but his observation is applicable to Black ROTC cadets. Because Blacks are under-represented in combat arms, the Black officers in branches like Infantry are not reasonably available for ROTC duty. This shortfall has affected the recruitment and assignment of quality Black combat arms officers to teach at HBCUs.

Major Ronald Clark's study of Black officer under-representation in the Infantry reached a similar conclusion.

"A shortage of Black Infantry role models also negatively affects accessions into the branch. This study identified the perception that very few high potential Infantry officers serve as ROTC instructors. The majority of the Black role models in ROTC programs tend to come from noncombat arms branches. The shortage of Black Infantry role models is a barrier to branch selection, due to a lack of knowledge about career opportunities in the Infantry."

To the Army's chagrin, ROTC assignments are not rewarding and highly sought after positions. Compound this with the very small numbers of Black combat arms officers in the Army and you have mostly non-combat arms officers assigned to HBCU ROTC positions. Consequently, HBCU ROTC cadets lack combat arms role models and develop a poor opinion of the combat arms. A survey of seventy-five officers attending the Army's Command and General Staff College found that forty percent of respondents believed there is a negative stereotype of the Infantry. Many respondents reported that a lack of ethnic diversity among combat arms officers perpetuates the belief that Black officers cannot succeed in combat arms branches.⁶⁷ Simply stated, unless HBCU cadets are given an example of successful combat arms officers, they will

⁶⁵ BG Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail", Parameters, Autumn 1999, pp. 54-69.http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99autumn/butler.htm.

⁶⁶ Ronald P. Clark, The Lack of Ethnic Diversity in the Infantry: *Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000, p.60

perceive that requesting a combat arms branch is not where Blacks should be. Especially, if the PMS and all other officers are non-combat arms officers.

Black combat arms officer role models are needed to instill confidence in HBCU cadets that choosing a combat arms branch can satisfy long-term career aspirations. Combat arms officers will also provide the necessary experience needed to effectively train HBCU cadets. Combat arms officers are better prepared to train cadets on the military proficiency activities (land navigation, APFT, BRM) because they trained on the same events during their career more rigorously than non-combat arms officers. Experience provides the combat arms officer the ability to better train and lead by example.

Culture Shock

HBCU cadets are exposed daily to a unique culture very different from that of Advanced Camp. HBCU campuses consist of Black students and Black officer instructors. The HBCU campus exposes the Black cadet to an environment that he comes to learn and accept. All campuses have their unique cultures and socioeconomic status. Nevertheless, the HBCU experience is unique and can have detrimental effects on the HBCU cadet when he transitions to the more integrated, very competitive environment of ROTC Advanced Camp. This skill requires a level of understanding about other cultures and the ability to acculturate. Integration into a foreign group is not easy and it takes some people longer to acquire this skill.

"The Army is primarily a reflection of a White-male dominated culture with which many young blacks have little or no experience...although we sometimes claim to have a homogeneous society in the United States, there are racial differences in attitudes on everything from politics to religion to music to dress. For a young Black man or woman who has grown up in a predominately Black neighborhood, possibly in a family with no previous military background, and who perhaps attended one of the historically black colleges, the jump into the white-male-dominated culture of the military can be a real culture shock."

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⁶⁷ Ronald P. Clark, The Lack of Ethnic Diversity in the Infantry: *Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000, p.60

⁶⁸ Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail," *Parameters*, (Autumn 1999), p. 54-69, available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99autumn/butler.htm; Internet; accessed 11 November 2001.

Brigadier General Butler's observation helps define the difficulties a Black officer has in assimilating into the Army culture. These difficulties are not foreign to the HBCU cadet who has to transition from his Black-male dominated culture at his campus to the more integrated environment of ROTC Advanced Camp. Exacerbating this difficulty is the very competitive nature of Advanced Camp and the first graded event conducted four days after arrival into this new setting. These challenges combine to create the effects of "culture shock." Culture shock occurs when a cadet lacks the innate and learned abilities to acculturate. It is very difficult to overcome these phenomena during thirty-five days of Advanced Camp. Failure to assimilate will lead to negative peer assessments and poor performance.




Figure 10. 2001 Advanced Camp CES Scores by School Category⁶⁹

As figure ten illustrates, the HBCU cadets' generally poor performance on key events results in a less competitive Cadet Evaluation System (CES) score.⁷⁰ For some HBCU cadets

"culture shock" must be a tough challenge to overcome in such a short period. Culture shock may explain some of the low scores achieved by cadets from HBCUs.

CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion

The U.S. Army is concerned that under existing accession rules and ROTC conditions Black officers are found primarily in the combat support and service support branches. Left unattended, the disproportionate number of Black officers in non-combat arms branches could lead to an Army EO problem. For that reason the Army has begun to address the issue and seeks to mitigate the under-representation of Black officers in combat arms branches. It may be hard to fathom such a condition when the availability of Blacks for military service in the military continues to grow. Future demographic studies predict that minorities will become a larger part of the military services. Given today's large percentage of Blacks in the military, one would dismiss any demographic disparities by just making a cursory assessment. However, a more detailed analysis of the Army officer corps produces incongruent results. The low number of Black officers in combat arms branches of the Army and the growing disproportionate number of Black officers occupying non-combat arms positions constitutes occupational segregation because gender and race groups distributed in service jobs do not reflect their overall representation in the force.

Occupational segregation is detrimental to an organization's culture because it creates a perception that certain occupations are reserved for certain types of people. Accessing the majority of Black officers into non-combat arms occupations creates the appearance that the Army reserves certain jobs for certain people. The Army obtains the majority of its general officer population from the pool of combat arms officers. The pool of combat arms officers is largely White. Soon minorities will account for very few senior positions in areas such as the

⁶⁹ Data from Kenneth Klimchock, United States Army Cadet Command, Recruiting Operations Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2002, several database files used to construct Figure 1-4,6-10.

Army's light infantry community. Because many of the Army's senior leaders come from such elite entities, this trend could result in fewer minority officers being selected for the most senior positions.⁷¹ Disproportionately accessing Blacks into non-combat arms branches will make vertical integration impossible.

Findings and Recommendations

Research shows that a Black cadet's accession into combat arms branches is determined in large part by two factors: cadet performance and cadet attitude toward service. Black HBCU cadets compete adequately with other cadets when it comes to on-campus ROTC scores but they do poorly at Advanced Camp. A cadet's performance at camp is influenced by training and preparation on campus and by his own personal attitude.

The Army should focus immediate attention to training HBCU cadets better. Training and preparation on campus begins with attaining a competitive GPA. Secondly, the ROTC cadre must be experienced enough to provide quality training for HBCU cadets. Training must be focused on the critical performance areas the cadet is evaluated at camp. These are leadership, land navigation, and APFT.

The ROTC program must also ensure that HBCU Cadets receive training to prepare them for the change in organizational environment they will encounter at Advanced Camp. Cadets from HBCUs need early experience in adapting to a more integrated organizational setting. The cadet must learn to adapt before he arrives at Advanced Camp. HBCU ROTC programs have in the past conducted specialized training to prepare cadets for operating in a diverse environment. This specialized training should be reassessed for its value and re-instituted. Without this training and preparation, cadets will suffer from "culture shock" during the early stages of camp.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹Ulmer, Walter F., and others, "American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program (Washington, DC: February 2000) 26.

HBCU cadet attitudes toward ROTC affect their performance at ROTC Advanced Camp. Black cadets, more than other ethnic groups, view the Army as unfair. This poor attitude toward ROTC is reflected poor performance and low Advanced Camp scores by HBCU cadets. The cadet's attitude is shaped both by campus peer pressures and by the absence of mentors to counter those pressures. Black cadets at HBCUs cannot receive mentoring from combat arms officers unless those officers are assigned to these jobs. Increasing the number of Black combat arms officers will greatly help to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, two conditions currently prevent this from happening. First, there is not a ready pool of Black combat arms officers in the Army to meet this requirement. Second, assignment to an ROTC position is not the best of all possible career choices. The Army must begin to address this issue and assign quality combat arms officers to ROTC positions at Historically Black Colleges and Universities.

One final recommendation includes the development of accessions and branching guidance similar to that of Army promotion boards guidance when dealing with issues of equal opportunity for race and gender. The Army Accessions board must issue guidance that ensures a more diverse approach to the branch selection process. During the branching process, distribute cadets in a manner that ensures that occupational segregation is avoided. Diversity is not defined solely on demographics in the recommended model. It includes diversity in GPA, Advanced Camp Score, and race. The process must be to provide accessions and promotion board guidance for goals that seek to approximately represent the numbers in the demographic population. Ironically, although we have applied guidelines for promotion boards in the past, "the driving force behind formal and actual integration of the armed forces was not social improvement or racial benevolence but necessity and the belated recognition of the military superiority of an integrated force. Put another way, it was the imperative of military effectiveness that led to equal opportunity, not the imperative of equal opportunity that led to greater military effectiveness." The Army must not seek to diversify to appease Equal Opportunity motivations but must seek to

diversify to create a more effective force. Direct intervention in the accession process is needed to increase the number of Black combat arms officers. Once the appropriate representation of Black officers is achieved in combat arms branches, then the accession process can return to placing emphasis on cadet choice of branch.

Army leaders and planners must monitor representation. Frustrating to leaders and planners will be the continued dialog over identifying the appropriate military representation levels of population subgroups. The requirement for ample numbers of quality personnel within the Army requires reliance on all demographic and social segments of America. Appropriate action in response to demographic trends is necessary to maintain and improve the force. The Army should increase the number of Black combat arms officers instructing Black cadets. Quality Black combat arms officers able to provide a positive example to cadets will greatly assist in preventing occupational segregation of Blacks in non-combat arms branches. The presence of these quality officers will also promote mentoring of cadets that will improve the attitude cadets have of the Army and ROTC.

⁷² Charles Moskos, "Mandating Inclusion", *Current*, July/August 1993, no. 354:20.

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